root@thehacksparrow:~/writeups$ SYSTEM ONLINE
root@sparrow:~/writeups$ cat eviction.md
// Blue Team & SOC

Eviction

10 Nov 2026 · 3 min read
Overview — A short Blue Team & SOC threat-intelligence exercise. A fictional SOC analyst at a metals manufacturer receives a warning that APT28 may be targeting her sector, and you use the MITRE ATT&CK Navigator layer for that group to work out which techniques to hunt for, tactic by tactic, from reconnaissance through exfiltration. No machine is attacked; the skill practised is reading a threat-actor profile and turning it into detection priorities.
PlatformTryHackMe
CategoryBlue Team & SOC
DifficultyEasy
RoomEviction

Task 1 — Understand the adversary

The scenario: an intelligence report says APT28 (also tracked as Fancy Bear, ATT&CK group G0007) may be going after companies like E-corp. The SOC analyst's job is to find out whether the group is already inside and to stop it if so. Instead of guessing, she opens the ATT&CK Navigator, a web tool that shades the techniques a group is known to use on top of the ATT&CK matrix. The room supplies a pre-built layer for APT28.

Method used for every question below: find the tactic column named in the question, look at the highlighted (APT28) techniques, expand the parent technique if needed, and answer using the exact text the Navigator shows. Each answer also tells you what telemetry to look at, which is the defensive payoff.

Reconnaissance and initial access

Q: What technique is used by the APT for both recon and initial access?
A: Spearphishing Link

Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Link (T1598.003) in Reconnaissance and Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002) in Initial Access are the same lure used twice, first to harvest credentials and later to deliver a payload. Defenders watch email and web-proxy logs for the links involved.

Resource development

Q: Which accounts might the APT compromise while developing resources?
A: Email Accounts

Under Compromise Accounts (T1586), the Email Accounts sub-technique (T1586.002) means the group takes over legitimate mailboxes to send convincing phishing. Mail from a known partner is therefore not automatically trustworthy.

Execution

Q: Which two techniques of user execution should Sunny look out for?
A: Malicious File and Malicious Link

These are the sub-techniques of User Execution (T1204): the victim opens an attachment or clicks a link, which starts the attacker's code.

Q: Which scripting interpreters should she search for to confirm execution?
A: PowerShell and Windows Command Shell

Command and Scripting Interpreter (T1059) covers PowerShell (T1059.001) and the Windows command shell (T1059.003). Process-creation logs (Windows event 4688 or Sysmon event 1) with suspicious parents and encoded command lines are the evidence to hunt.

Persistence

Q: Which registry keys should be observed for persistence changes?
A: Registry Run Keys

The Navigator wording is "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder" (T1547.001). Monitor writes to CurrentVersion\Run and RunOnce under both HKLM and HKCU.

Defence evasion and discovery

Q: Which system binary's execution should be scrutinised for proxy execution?
A: Rundll32

System Binary Proxy Execution (T1218) abuses trusted, signed Windows binaries to run attacker code; for this group the sub-technique is Rundll32 (T1218.011). A DLL launched through rundll32.exe from a user-writable path or with an odd export name is a classic hit.

Q: A tcpdump binary is found on a compromised host. Which discovery technique might this be?
A: Network Sniffing

Network Sniffing (T1040) captures traffic to harvest credentials or learn the network layout. A packet-capture tool on a server that has no reason to run one is a red flag.

Lateral movement and collection

Q: Which remote service should be observed for lateral movement?
A: SMB/Windows Admin Shares

Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002) uses shares such as C$ and ADMIN$ with valid credentials to copy tools and run commands. Watch for network logons (event 4624 type 3) followed by access to administrative shares (event 5140).

Q: Which information repository is the likely target of data theft?
A: Sharepoint

Data from Information Repositories: Sharepoint (T1213.002) fits a group after intellectual property, since document libraries concentrate it. SharePoint audit logs for bulk downloads or unusual accounts are the place to look.

Command and control

Q: If the APT cannot reach its C2 directly, which types of proxy might it use?
A: External Proxy and Multi-hop Proxy

Proxy (T1090) hides the real C2 behind intermediaries: External Proxy (T1090.002) and Multi-hop Proxy (T1090.003). Egress filtering and proxy/DNS logs help spot traffic to unexpected relays.

Key takeaways

  • A threat group's ATT&CK profile is a ready-made hunting backlog: each technique maps to a log source and a detection idea.
  • The Navigator shows which techniques a group is documented using; it does not prove it is present. Pair it with your own telemetry.
  • APT28 here follows a classic kill chain: phish with links from compromised mailboxes, execute through PowerShell and cmd, persist with Run keys, evade with Rundll32, sniff the network, move over SMB admin shares, collect from SharePoint, and exfiltrate through proxies.
  • Prioritise detections for techniques that appear across several stages (spearphishing links, script interpreters), since they give the earliest warning.
  • Always answer with the exact Navigator wording when a question demands it, and learn the parent/sub-technique naming (for example T1021 vs T1021.002).