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// Blue Team & SOC

Diamond Model

22 Nov 2026 · 6 min read
Overview — A Blue Team & SOC room on the Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis (Caltagirone, Pendergast and Betz, 2013). Every intrusion event is described by four connected core features, adversary, infrastructure, capability and victim, enriched with meta-features such as timestamp, phase and result, and two axes (social-political and technology). The room walks through each element and ends with a hands-on exercise that populates a diamond from a real 2015 incident report.
PlatformTryHackMe
CategoryBlue Team & SOC
DifficultyEasy
RoomDiamond Model

Task 1 — Introduction

The Diamond Model treats each intrusion as a set of events, and each event as an atomic unit with four vertices joined by edges. The edges matter as much as the vertices: they express relationships such as "the adversary develops a capability" or "the capability is delivered over infrastructure to the victim".

              Adversary
             /         \
   (develops)             (controls)
           /               \
    Capability ---------- Infrastructure
           \               /
   (exploits)              (connects to)
             \         /
                Victim

  Axis between Adversary and Victim:       social-political (intent, need)
  Axis between Capability and Infrastructure: technology (how it is delivered)

Why analysts like it: it gives a common vocabulary for pivoting. Knowing one vertex (for instance a malicious domain) lets you ask which capability was delivered over it, who else was victimised through it, and what that suggests about the adversary. It also makes incidents explainable to non-technical audiences, and groups of events can be clustered into campaigns and activity threads.

Task 2 — Adversary

The adversary is the actor or organisation that uses a capability against a victim to achieve an intent. Early in an investigation this vertex is usually empty or low-confidence; attribution is built later from signatures, infrastructure reuse and other evidence. The model separates two roles:

  • Adversary operator — the person or people actually carrying out the intrusion.
  • Adversary customer — the party who benefits from it. It may be the same as the operator, or a different group that commissions the work (one customer can direct several operators, each with their own tools and infrastructure).

The distinction helps with understanding intent, attribution and persistence: a criminal operator working for a state customer behaves differently from a lone actor.

Q: What is the term for a person/group that has the intention to perform malicious actions against cyber resources?
A: Adversary Operator

Q: What is the term of the person or a group that will receive the benefits from the cyberattacks?
A: Adversary Customer

Task 3 — Victim

The victim is the target of the adversary and can be an organisation, a person, a mailbox, an IP address or a domain. Every intrusion has one. Two sub-concepts serve different analytic purposes:

  • Victim personae — the people and organisations targeted: names, industries, job roles, interests.
  • Victim assets — the attack surface the adversary actually touches: systems, networks, email addresses, hosts, IPs, social media accounts.

In a spear-phishing campaign, the persona is the employee chosen for their role, while the asset is their mailbox and workstation. Keeping them apart lets you see that different personae may be reached through the same asset, or the same persona through several assets.

Q: What is the term that applies to the Diamond Model for organizations or people that are being targeted?
A: Victim Personae

Task 4 — Capability

The capability is the set of skills, tools and techniques the adversary uses in the event, in other words their TTPs. It ranges from manual password guessing to custom malware development. Related terms:

  • Capability capacity — the vulnerabilities and exposures a given capability can exploit.
  • Adversary arsenal — the full set of capabilities an adversary owns; the combined capacities of its individual capabilities.

An adversary does not need to build everything: buying access to malware or ransomware-as-a-service counts as having the capability.

Q: Provide the term for the set of tools or capabilities that belong to an adversary.
A: Adversary Arsenal

Task 5 — Infrastructure

Infrastructure is the physical or logical communication structure used to deliver a capability, maintain control of it, and receive results (for example C2 and exfiltration channels). IP addresses, domains, email accounts and even a booby-trapped USB stick all qualify. The model classifies it by who controls it:

ClassControlled byExamples
Type 1The adversary, or under their direct controlTheir own servers, a C2 host they rent and manage
Type 2An intermediary, knowingly or not; this is what the victim sees as "the adversary"Malware staging servers, malicious domains, compromised email accounts; used to obscure the source and hinder attribution
Service providersOrganisations the adversary depends onISPs, domain registrars, webmail providers

Service providers matter defensively because they are the pressure point for takedowns and for obtaining records about Type 1 and Type 2 assets.

Q: To which type of infrastructure do malicious domains and compromised email accounts belong?
A: Type 2 Infrastructure

Q: What type of infrastructure is most likely owned by an adversary?
A: Type 1 Infrastructure

Task 6 — Event Meta-Features

Six optional meta-features add context to an event. They are not required to build a diamond, but they make events comparable and sortable.

Meta-featureWhat it records
TimestampWhen the event started and ended. Patterns in time help group activity and can hint at the adversary's working hours or time zone.
PhaseWhere the event sits in the intrusion. Axiom 4 states that every malicious activity has two or more phases that must succeed in sequence, which maps neatly onto the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain (reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation, command and control, actions on objectives).
ResultThe outcome: success, failure or unknown, optionally tied to the CIA triad (confidentiality, integrity or availability compromised) or to the post-conditions achieved, such as credentials stolen.
DirectionThe flow of the event. Seven values exist: Victim-to-Infrastructure, Infrastructure-to-Victim, Infrastructure-to-Infrastructure, Adversary-to-Infrastructure, Infrastructure-to-Adversary, Bidirectional, Unknown.
MethodologyThe general class of activity: phishing, DDoS, port scan, breach and so on.
ResourcesExternal things the event needs to succeed: software, knowledge, information (such as stolen credentials), hardware, funds, facilities and access (for example a network path to the victim).

Axiom 5 says every intrusion event requires one or more external resources to be satisfied before success, which is why Resources is a meta-feature in its own right.

Q: What meta-feature does the axiom "Every malicious activity contains two or more phases which must be successfully executed in succession to achieve the desired result" belong to?
A: Phase

Q: You can label the event results as "success", "failure", and "unknown". What meta-feature is this related to?
A: Result

Q: To what meta-feature is this phrase applicable "Every intrusion event requires one or more external resources to be satisfied prior to success"?
A: Resources

Task 7 — Social-Political Component

This axis connects the adversary to the victim and captures why: the needs and intent that drive the attack, such as financial gain, espionage, hacktivism or reputation within a hacker community. A typical example is a botnet operator for whom compromised machines are a product; the victim unknowingly supplies computing power and bandwidth (for crypto mining, say) and the adversary consumes it for profit.

Task 8 — Technology Component

The technology axis connects capability and infrastructure and describes how the adversary operates and communicates. A watering-hole attack is the textbook example: the adversary compromises a legitimate website the targets are known to visit (infrastructure), and uses it to serve an exploit (capability). Understanding this axis shows which technologies a defender must monitor to break the delivery chain.

Task 9 — Practice Analysis

The practical provides a static page with an unfilled diamond. Using a public incident report on the December 2015 attack on the Ukrainian power grid (the room notes it predates recent developments), you click each of the eight areas (the four core features plus the meta and axis segments) and fill them with details from the report. Good starting points for the report are the delivery mechanism, the tooling used for remote access, the entities affected and the stages of the intrusion. When all eight areas are complete the page reveals a flag.

Q: Complete all eight areas of the diamond. What is the flag that is displayed to you?
A: FLAG

Task 10 — Conclusion

The room closes by stressing that the model improves the rigour of intrusion analysis and helps translate technical findings for executives. There are no questions.

Key takeaways

  • Every event has four vertices: adversary, infrastructure, capability, victim; the edges are relationships you can pivot along.
  • Split adversary into operator and customer, victim into personae and assets, infrastructure into Type 1, Type 2 and service providers.
  • Meta-features (timestamp, phase, result, direction, methodology, resources) make events comparable; phase links the model to the Kill Chain.
  • The social-political axis answers "why", the technology axis answers "how".
  • Adversary fields are often empty at first; fill the others, then pivot to discover it.