TombWatcher
Executive summary — TombWatcher is a Domain Controller that chains seven links of ACL (DACL) abuse, each one enabling the next without a single memory-corruption exploit: starting from an assumed-breach credential and ending at Domain Admin, by way of targeted Kerberoasting, reading a group Managed Service Account's (gMSA) password, resurrecting a deleted user from the AD Recycle Bin — the source of the machine's name — and a modern AD CS attack: ESC15 / EKUwu (CVE-2024-49019) against a legacy certificate template.
| Platform | Hack The Box |
| Operating system | Windows Server 2019 (AD / AD CS) |
| Difficulty | Medium |
| Status | Retired |
| Target IP | <TARGET_IP> |
| Domain | tombwatcher.htb |
Attack map
henry : H3nry_987TGV! (assumed breach)
| WriteSPN
v
Alfred -- targeted Kerberoast --> basketball
| AddSelf
v
Infrastructure group
| ReadGMSAPassword
v
gMSA ANSIBLE_DEV$ (NTLM cb3161cb2c9d84b58ba3014f55040d75)
| ForceChangePassword
v
sam -- set password --> Newpass123!
| WriteOwner
v
john (set owner -> GenericAll -> set password) <- user.txt, WinRM
| GenericAll
v
OU=ADCS (empty) -> AD Recycle Bin: restore cert_admin (SID -1111)
|
v
AD CS ESC15/EKUwu (WebServer template, Schema v1, ESS=True)
inject SAN=administrator + AppPolicy "Client Authentication"
(PKINIT rejects it; schannel/LDAP accepts it)
v
[ROOT] LDAPS as Administrator -> add john to Domain Admins -> root.txt
1. Reconnaissance
The initial scan confirms a Domain Controller for tombwatcher.htb:
sudo nmap -Pn --top-ports 50 <TARGET_IP> # 53,80,135,139,389,445,464,636... (DC)
netexec smb <TARGET_IP>
DC01 (name:DC01) (domain:tombwatcher.htb) (signing:True) (Null Auth:True)
The starting model is assumed breach: the exercise begins with a domain user credential already in hand (henry / H3nry_987TGV!), the way most real red team engagements start once initial access (phishing, a leaked credential) is already established. Validating it and enumerating the rest of the accounts:
netexec smb <TARGET_IP> -u henry -p 'H3nry_987TGV!' # [+]
netexec smb <TARGET_IP> -u henry -p 'H3nry_987TGV!' --users
Administrator, Guest, krbtgt, Henry, Alfred, sam, john
Before touching Kerberos or AD CS it's worth syncing the local clock with the DC's — Kerberos requires under 5 minutes of skew, and any later certipy operation would fail silently on a skewed clock:
sudo ntpdate -u <TARGET_IP>
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