Intelligence
Executive summary — Intelligence is a Medium Active Directory box where the initial vector lives in public PDF metadata: the
Creatorfield of dozens of predictably-named documents reveals the domain's username format, and one of them documents a default password. With password spraying we get the first account (user flag). A share leaks a script that HTTP-queriesweb*DNS records every 5 minutes: creating a malicious one and capturing with Responder yields a second user's NTLMv2 hash. That account can read a gMSA's password with constrained delegation, which we use to forge an S4U2Self/S4U2Proxy ticket impersonating Administrator.
| Platform | Hack The Box |
| Operating system | Windows — Domain Controller |
| Domain | intelligence.htb |
| Difficulty | Medium |
| Status | Retired |
| Target IP | 10.129.95.154 |
| tun0 (attacker) | <ATTACKER_IP> |
Attack map
[1] Recon -- full Windows DC (53,80,88,135,139,389,445,464,593,636,5985,9389)
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[2] Web: /documents/ -- 403 (no listing) but PDFs with a date pattern YYYY-MM-DD-upload.pdf
brute forcing 2020 dates -> dozens of PDFs downloaded
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[3] exiftool (Creator field) -- reveals domain users (FirstName.LastName)
pdftotext + grep -- "New Account Guide" document with a default password
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[4] Password spraying (netexec) -- Tiffany.Molina:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876
+-> Users share accessible -> user.txt
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[5] IT share -- downdetector.ps1: queries web* DNS records every 5min and HTTP GETs them
(notifies Ted.Graves@intelligence.htb)
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[6] dnstool.py (krbrelayx) -- create a webYuba record -> attacker IP ->
Responder captures Ted.Graves' NTLMv2 -> cracked with John -> Mr.Teddy
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[7] As Ted.Graves: no useful WinRM access, but he can read a gMSA's password
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[8] gMSADumper -- NTLM hash (and AES keys) of the gMSA svc_int$
svc_int$ has constrained delegation over WWW/dc.intelligence.htb
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[9] impacket-getST -- S4U2Self+S4U2Proxy impersonating Administrator ->
impacket-psexec (Kerberos) -> root.txt
1. Initial reconnaissance
nmap -sCV -Pn 10.129.95.154
53/tcp DNS 80/tcp HTTP 88/tcp Kerberos 135/tcp RPC
139/tcp NetBIOS 389/tcp LDAP 445/tcp SMB 464/tcp Kerberos pwd change
593/tcp RPC over HTTP 636/tcp LDAPS 5985/tcp WinRM 9389/tcp AD Web Services
Typical Windows Domain Controller services (Kerberos, LDAP/LDAPS, SMB, WinRM, AD Web Services), plus an 80/tcp that tells us a web app is running on the DC itself.
netexec smb 10.129.95.154 -u guest -p ''
smbclient -L //10.129.95.154 -N
No useful guest access — on to the web.
Resumen ejecutivo — Intelligence es una Medium de Active Directory donde el vector inicial vive en metadatos de PDFs públicos: el campo
Creatorde docenas de documentos con nombre predecible revela el formato de usuarios del dominio, y uno de ellos documenta una contraseña por defecto. Con password spraying conseguimos la primera cuenta (user flag). Un share filtra un script que consulta registros DNSweb*por HTTP cada 5 minutos: creando uno malicioso y capturando con Responder obtenemos el hash NTLMv2 de un segundo usuario. Esa cuenta puede leer la contraseña de una gMSA con delegación restringida, que usamos para forjar un ticket S4U2Self/S4U2Proxy impersonando a Administrator.
| Plataforma | Hack The Box |
| Sistema operativo | Windows — Domain Controller |
| Dominio | intelligence.htb |
| Dificultad | Medium |
| Estado | Retired |
| IP objetivo | 10.129.95.154 |
| tun0 (atacante) | <ATTACKER_IP> |
Mapa del ataque
[1] Recon -- DC de Windows completo (53,80,88,135,139,389,445,464,593,636,5985,9389)
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[2] Web: /documents/ -- 403 (sin listado) pero PDFs con patron de fecha YYYY-MM-DD-upload.pdf
fuerza bruta de fechas de 2020 -> decenas de PDFs descargados
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[3] exiftool (campo Creator) -- revela usuarios del dominio (Nombre.Apellido)
pdftotext + grep -- documento "New Account Guide" con password por defecto
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[4] Password spraying (netexec) -- Tiffany.Molina:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876
+-> share Users accesible -> user.txt
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[5] Share IT -- downdetector.ps1: consulta cada 5min registros DNS web* y hace HTTP GET
(notifica a Ted.Graves@intelligence.htb)
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[6] dnstool.py (krbrelayx) -- crear registro webYuba -> IP atacante ->
Responder captura NTLMv2 de Ted.Graves -> crackeo con John -> Mr.Teddy
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[7] Con Ted.Graves: sin acceso util por WinRM, pero puede leer la password de una gMSA
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[8] gMSADumper -- hash NTLM (y claves AES) de la gMSA svc_int$
svc_int$ tiene delegacion restringida sobre WWW/dc.intelligence.htb
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[9] impacket-getST -- S4U2Self+S4U2Proxy impersonando Administrator ->
impacket-psexec (Kerberos) -> root.txt
1. Reconocimiento inicial
nmap -sCV -Pn 10.129.95.154
53/tcp DNS 80/tcp HTTP 88/tcp Kerberos 135/tcp RPC
139/tcp NetBIOS 389/tcp LDAP 445/tcp SMB 464/tcp Kerberos pwd change
593/tcp RPC over HTTP 636/tcp LDAPS 5985/tcp WinRM 9389/tcp AD Web Services
Servicios típicos de un Domain Controller Windows (Kerberos, LDAP/LDAPS, SMB, WinRM, AD Web Services), más un 80/tcp que indica que hay una aplicación web corriendo en el propio DC.
netexec smb 10.129.95.154 -u guest -p ''
smbclient -L //10.129.95.154 -N
Sin acceso útil por invitado — pasamos a la web.
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