Cerberus
Executive summary — Cerberus models a realistic hybrid monitoring setup: a Linux virtual machine hosts Icinga Web 2 2.11.2, exposed externally only on port
8080, and that VM is joined to thecerberus.localdomain whose Windows Domain Controller hosts it and also runs a ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus identity self-service portal reachable only from the host itself. The name isn't accidental: like the three-headed guardian, the box is cleared in three chained layers. An unauthenticated path traversal (CVE-2022-24716) leaks Icinga's configuration and a plaintext password; that account enables an authenticated RCE (CVE-2022-24715) via an SSH resource holding a PHP+PEM polyglot key; inside the VM, a vulnerable SUIDfirejailbinary (CVE-2022-31214) grants local root; SSSD's offline cache stores a domain user's hash, crackable with rockyou, which is reused against the Domain Controller's WinRM for user.txt; and, with no local privilege escalation available on Windows, the only path left is ADSelfService Plus, whose SAML endpoint only listens on127.0.0.1:9251— reachable only by standing up a reverse SOCKS tunnel with chisel from the DC itself, to fire a preauthenticated RCE against it as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM (CVE-2022-47966).
| Platform | Hack The Box |
| Operating system | Ubuntu 22.04 (Icinga VM) domain-joined to a Windows Server (Domain Controller for cerberus.local) |
| Difficulty | Hard |
| Status | Retired |
| Target IP | <TARGET_IP> |
Attack map
[8080/HTTP] icinga.cerberus.local -- path traversal (CVE-2022-24716) -> authentication.ini
| plaintext credential: matthew : IcingaWebPassword2023
v
[Icinga Web 2] SSH resource -- PHP+PEM polyglot key (CVE-2022-24715) -> malicious module
| authenticated RCE as www-data
v
[SUID] firejail --join (CVE-2022-31214) -- namespace TOCTOU -> root@icinga (VM)
| SSSD offline cache -> matthew SHA-512 hash -> hashcat -> 147258369
v
[WinRM 5985] DC cerberus.local -- credential reuse (matthew) -> user.txt
| no local privesc -- only remaining service: ADSelfService Plus (:9251, 127.0.0.1 only)
v
[chisel] reverse SOCKS via c.exe on the DC -- tunnel to 127.0.0.1:9251
| preauth SAML RCE (CVE-2022-47966, rt:exec XSLT transform)
v
[SYSTEM] ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus -> root.txt
1. Reconnaissance
A full port scan shows a minimal surface: a single HTTP service.
nmap -p8080 -sCV -Pn -oN nmap-services.txt <TARGET_IP>
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
8080/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.52 ((Ubuntu))
|_http-open-proxy: Proxy might be redirecting requests
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://icinga.cerberus.local:8080/icingaweb2
The redirect gives away two things at once: the vhost icinga.cerberus.local and the app's base path, /icingaweb2. That a monitoring server is the only entry point, with nothing else exposed (no SSH, no SMB, not even the DC itself visible from outside), already hints that the entire first half of the chain has to run through Icinga.
echo "<TARGET_IP> icinga.cerberus.local cerberus.local" | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts
Browsing to http://icinga.cerberus.local:8080/icingaweb2 brings up the Icinga Web 2 login. Versioned static assets served on the page (CSS/JS paths) pin down the exact branch as 2.11.x without any authentication — precisely the version affected by the pair of CVEs published in March 2022 that kicks off the whole intrusion.
Root Access unlocks the content you can't see — everything else on the site is already open.
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