Administrator
Executive summary — Administrator is an assumed breach scenario: a low-privilege domain credential is handed over and the goal is to escalate to Domain Admin. There isn't a single CVE anywhere in the chain — the entire compromise rests on badly delegated Active Directory permissions chained together, plus a backup file that never should have lived on an FTP service running on the domain controller itself. That's exactly what makes it representative of a real corporate AD: the attack path isn't opened by a missing patch, but by the historical buildup of delegations nobody ever audited as a graph.
| Platform | Hack The Box |
| Operating system | Windows Server 2022 |
| Difficulty | Medium |
| Status | Retired |
| Target IP | <TARGET_IP> |
Attack map
[HANDED OVER] olivia : ichliebedich (assumed breach)
│ ACE GenericAll over the user object michael
▼
[ACE #1] michael ◄── bloodyAD set password
│ ACE ForceChangePassword over the user object benjamin
▼
[ACE #2] benjamin ◄── sole member of "Share Moderators"
│ 21/FTP → reachable home dir → Backup.psafe3 (952 bytes)
▼
[Password Safe V3] pwsafe2john + rockyou → master "tekieromucho"
│ Twofish-CBC → alexander✗ (disabled) · emma✗ (disabled) · emily✓
▼
[emily] Remote Management Users → WinRM (user.txt)
│ ACE GenericWrite over ethan → fake SPN planted
▼
[Targeted Kerberoasting] ethan's TGS cracked → "limpbizkit"
│ ACE GetChanges + GetChangesAll over the DOMAIN object
▼
[DCSync] Administrator's NT hash: 3dc553ce4b9fd20bd016e098d2d2fd2e
│ Pass-the-Hash → WinRM 5985
▼
[DOMAIN ADMIN] administrator\administrator (root.txt)
1. Reconnaissance
sudo nmap -p- --min-rate 3000 -T4 -Pn -oN scans/allports.txt <TARGET_IP>
Not shown: 65509 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT STATE SERVICE
21/tcp open ftp
53/tcp open domain
88/tcp open kerberos-sec
135/tcp open msrpc
139/tcp open netbios-ssn
389/tcp open ldap
445/tcp open microsoft-ds
464/tcp open kpasswd5
593/tcp open http-rpc-epmap
636/tcp open ldapssl
3268/tcp open globalcatLDAP
3269/tcp open globalcatLDAPssl
5985/tcp open wsman
9389/tcp open adws
47001/tcp open winrm
49664/tcp open unknown
The 53+88+135+139+389+445+464+636+3268+3269+9389 footprint is a textbook Domain Controller. What isn't textbook: port 21. A DC has no operational reason to serve FTP. When a scan reveals a service that doesn't belong to the host's role, it's almost always the element added on purpose — and in a real environment, the asset nobody remembers installing. Flagged as a priority target from minute one.
sudo nmap -p21,53,88,135,389,445,5985 -sCV -oN scans/services.txt <TARGET_IP>
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
21/tcp open ftp Microsoft ftpd
| ftp-syst:
|_ SYST: Windows_NT
53/tcp open domain Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp open kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2026-09-17 22:17:24Z)
389/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: administrator.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp open microsoft-ds?
5985/tcp open http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
Host script results:
|_clock-skew: 7h00m05s
| smb2-security-mode:
| 3:1:1:
|_ Message signing enabled and required
Three actionable facts from this scan: the domain is administrator.htb (use this name in every tool from here on), there's a 7-hour clock skew that will break Kerberos until fixed (§1.1), and SMB signing is required, which rules out any NTLM relay outright.
sudo bash -c 'echo "<TARGET_IP> administrator.htb dc.administrator.htb DC" >> /etc/hosts'
Kerberos issues tickets for a Service Principal Name built from the service's name, not its IP. Attacking by address forces a fallback to NTLM, and with SMB signing required several paths close down. All work targets
dc.administrator.htbfrom here on.
1.1 The Kerberos clock skew
date # Thu Sep 17 03:17:37 PM UTC 2026 <- Kali
# server time: 2026-09-17 22:17:24Z <- DC
Kerberos embeds timestamps in the authenticator specifically to prevent replay attacks, and the KDC rejects any request whose skew exceeds MaxTimeSkew (5 minutes by default). With a 7-hour gap, every Kerberos operation fails with KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW.
sudo ntpdate -u <TARGET_IP>
CLOCK: time stepped by 25206.536621
2026-09-17 22:17:43.794292 (+0000) +25206.536621 +/- 0.018821 <TARGET_IP> s1 no-leap
The mistake that cost an attempt: after syncing, the first
GetUserSPNsfailed again withKRB_AP_ERR_SKEW. The cause was thatsystemd-timesyncdwas still active on Kali and re-adjusted the clock back to the real time within minutes, undoing the manual sync. Syncing once isn't enough: the system's NTP service has to be disabled for the duration of the exercise.
sudo systemctl stop systemd-timesyncd
sudo timedatectl set-ntp false
sudo ntpdate -u <TARGET_IP>
CLOCK: time stepped by 25214.667703
Thu Sep 17 10:20:52 PM UTC 2026
From here on every Kerberos operation works. Alternative without touching the system clock: faketime shifts time only for the attacking process, avoiding broken TLS certificates or local logs — the correct choice in a real engagement.
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